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Abstract 
Purpose-The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in 
Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Design/Methodology-This study employs agency theory to understand the institutional 
shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data is collected through 
qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions. 
 
Findings-The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The 
study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt 
an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension 
structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in 
shareholder activism.  
 
Research implications-The research study advances our understanding of the status-quo of 
institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria. 
 
Practical implications- The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that 
regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect 
effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder 
activism.  
 
Originality-This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of 
complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial 
institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country. 
 
Keywords: Agency theory; institutional shareholders; Nigeria; shareholder activism. 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shareholder activism is “the use of ownership position to actively influence company policy 
and practice” (Sjöström, 2008: p.142). The literature on shareholder activism has identified 
institutional shareholders as either adopting an active or a passive approach to shareholder 
activism (Ghahramani, 2013; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Yuan et al, 2009). In this discourse, 
sub-Saharan African perspectives are frequently neglected. This study examines the Nigerian 
setting based on the following rationale: first, this setting provides an opportunity to examine 
a situation where shareholder activism in a country is dominated by the presence of 
shareholders’ associations rather than institutional shareholders. The setting allows us 
understand why academics have overlooked institutional shareholder participation in 
shareholder activism in Nigeria (Adegbite et al., 2012; Amao and Amaeshi 2008), enabling 
us to move on from the normative claim by Yakasai (2001) that institutional shareholder 
activism does exist in the country. The second rationale is that academic research has shown 
the need for shareholders to participate actively in the promotion of good corporate 
governance given reported cases of weak board oversight, audit scandal, corporate fraud and 
lack of transparency in Nigeria (Adegbite, 2012; Okike, 2007; Owolabi, 2007). Therefore, the 
Nigerian setting provides an opportunity to explore the role taken up by institutional 
shareholders in contributing towards this objective. Thirdly, recent trends have shown that the 
pension industry in Nigeria is dominated by private pension funds rather than public pension 
funds. This context allows us explore the implications for shareholder activism.  
 
Our central research question is to investigate the existence of institutional shareholder 
activism in Nigeria. Overall, our study first contributes to the broad literature on institutional 
shareholder activism. This has been overlooked in the prior literature on Nigeria which has 
largely concentrated on activist work by shareholders’ associations (Adegbite et al., 2012; 
Amao and Amaeshi 2008; Uche and Atkins, 2015). Second, our study contributes to the prior 
research on pension fund participation in institutional shareholder activism. The existing 
literature addresses public pension funds managed by a single type financial institution 
(Bainbridge, 2008; Carleton et al, 1998; Cremers and Nair, 2005). By contrast, this study 
provides new insights into the complexities associated with an institutional arrangement 
where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private 
pension funds in a country. The findings highlight the importance of coordination in 
shareholder activism between two financial institutions: pension fund administrators and 
pension fund custodians. Third, the study makes a methodological contribution by using an 
interpretive approach to explore the view of institutional shareholders in shareholder 
activism. This differs from the prior literature which is dominated by positivist or normative 
approach (Brav et al, 2008; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). The rest 
of the paper is organised as follows: a literature review followed by a section on the context, 
methodology, results and conclusions.  
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Shareholder activism: An Agency theory perspective 
The literature suggest that agency problems reflect a conflict of interest between agents and 
principals. Several scholars have examined a variety of propositions on how to tackle agency 
problems. The suggestions include market control through takeovers, regulation, monitoring 
(directors and external auditors), managerial incentives, contracts and shareholder activism 
(Becht et al, 2008; Cziraki et al, 2010; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Rock, 1990). Shareholder 
activism has largely focused on shareholder intervention by institutional shareholders. They 
reveal that institutional shareholders either adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder 
activism (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Rock, 1990).  
 
2.2 Active and passive approach to shareholder activism 
Institutional shareholder activism: Active approach  
Most of the studies that explore shareholder activism are based on agency theory. They show 
that the field of institutional shareholder activism has been actively dominated by public 
pension funds, mutual funds and hedge funds with banks, and insurance companies taking on 
a more passive role. For instance, the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) and the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CaIPERS), both in the USA, continue to spearhead shareholder activism (Carleton et 
al., 1998; Brav et al, 2008; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996). 
These groups engage in shareholder activism by negotiating at private meetings, voting, court 
filings, and submission of proposals (Cziraki et al, 2010; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; 
Goranova and Ryan, 2014). Research studies have argued that institutional shareholder 
activists have contributed to changes in corporate governance practices, social and financial 
agenda/performance in target companies. They do this through their investment strategies, 
confidential voting, corporate takeovers, poison pills, executive compensation, board 
nomination and independence (Bainbridge, 2006; Brav et al, 2008; Rock, 1990; Romano, 
2001; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007).  
 
Institutional shareholder activism: Passive approach  
Studies have found that some institutional shareholders adopt a passive approach to 
shareholder activism. The literature indicates that legal and regulatory barriers may hinder 
institutional shareholders from actively participating in shareholder activism (Bainbridge, 
2006).  For example, Bainbridge (2006) noted that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) rules on insider trading have made shareholders more cautious, and also discouraged 
shareholder co-ordination, and communication in the USA. The Netherlands faces similar 
regulatory obstacles, where only directors (and shareholder with up to a 1% stake in the 
company) are allowed to sponsor proposals (Cziraki et al., 2010). Research studies have also 
pointed out that some institutional shareholders prioritise the protection of their business 
relationships in the face of conflicting interest over activism. Institutional shareholders may 
be unwilling to engage in shareholder activism because of their pursuit of short-term profit. 
This is usually prevalent amongst private pension funds that wish to avoid potential damage 
to business reputation, governance cost and loss of competitive information advantage 
(Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Partnoy and Thomas, 2007; Romano, 2001; Ryan and Schneider, 
2002). In sum, scholars have identified business interests, monitoring costs, free-rider 
problems, size of shareholdings and liquidity as important factors that are evaluated in 
strategic decision-making (Brickley et al, 1988; Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Pound, 1988). In 
sum, it has been recognised that passive institutional shareholders are primarily driven by 
their internal opportunistic agenda (Bainbridge, 2006).  
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3. PENSION FUNDS AS INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDERS IN NIGERIA 
In Nigeria, most of the institutional shareholders have close relationships with banks. Banks 
usually have equity holdings in securities house, asset management companies and pension 
funds. A large proportion of mutual funds which are predominantly open-ended funds, are 
operated by asset management companies established and controlled directly or indirectly by 
the banks in accordance with the Investment and Securities Act (1999) (Ibrahim, 2005; SEC, 
2010). In January 2011, there were 43 mutual funds managed by 23 fund managers valued at 
N94.37 billion
1
 ($0.58 billion dollars) (NSE, 2011). Banks in Nigeria have shareholding 
interest in subsidiaries that include pension fund administrators or pension funds custodians. 
For example, Guaranty Trust Bank is associated with ARM pensions fund administrators, 
StanbicIbtc bank is associated with Stanbic pension fund administrators and Zenith Bank Plc 
is associated with Zenith pension fund custodians. Before 2004, there was one only public 
pension body, Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF) that provided pension funds 
services to a large proportion of the Nigeria. In 2004, the Nigerian Federal government 
introduced a pension fund reform which involved restructuring the pension fund model. As 
part of the reforms, private pension funds were created. Companies and their employees were 
encouraged to register with private pension funds rather than remain with the public pension 
fund body, NSITF.  
 
The pension reform encouraged a substantial shift in the warehousing of, and growth in, 
pension funds in the Nigerian market (Pencom, 2008; Pencom Annual report, 2011). The 
pension reform has led to the domination of the market by the private pension funds in 
contrast to USA where the public pension fund is the dominant player in the pension market 
(Bainbridge, 2008; Carleton et al, 1998; Pencom Annual report, 2011). The reformed pension 
sector model is a mirror of the Chilean model based on a private scheme for funding 
pensions. A significant aspect of the 2004 reform is the creation of two separate financial 
institutions, pension fund custodians (PFC) and pension funds administrators (PFAs) to run 
the pension fund schemes. PFC and PFAs have different functions. The PFAs collect pension 
fund contributions from clients. PFAs also provide advice on pension investment. The 
pension funds collected from clients by PFAs are warehoused with the PFCs. The PFCs view 
their role as primarily providing investment services on behalf of the PFAs. The PFAs and 
PFCs are expected to collaborate in overseeing pension funds. PFCs receive proxy voting 
rights on behalf of PFAs and cannot act without explicit instruction of PFAs (Pencom, 2008; 
Pencom Annual report, 2011). This makes co-ordination and communication important in 
their relationship due to the separation of roles.  
 
Another unique feature of the Nigerian pension fund environment is the concentration of 
equity holdings in a handful of PFAs. The top three pension fund administrators controlled 
46% while the top five controlled over 61% of the pension market share as at 2011. The top 
three PFAs are almost forty times the size of the bottom ten in terms of Pension assets 
(Pencom, first quarter report, 2010). This moves power to the domain of a few PFAs. This 
skewness in size is interesting as we have the opportunity to study large and small pension 
funds that have the ability to act independently or strategically cooperate with other groups. 
We point out that the equity market investment for pension fund is highly regulated in 
contrast to other types of institutional shareholders in Nigeria. Pension funds can only invest 
in companies that meet the approved credit rating as advised by the Pension funds regulator, 
the Nigerian Pension Commission (NPC) (Pension Reform Act, 2004). Under the Pension 
Reform Act (PRA) of 2004, pension funds are prohibited from allocating more than 25% of 
their pension asset in the equities market (Pension Reform Act, 2004). As a result, PFAs limit 
their investment in quoted stocks to below 25%. 
5 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
This study employs a qualitative research method to provide necessary insights into the 
institutional shareholder activism context in Nigeria. We used qualitative interviews because 
this allowed us capture insights into events associated with shareholder activism through the 
personal account of individuals’ experiences (Adegbite et al., 2012; Hendry et al., 2007). Our 
data is drawn from two stages of in-depth interviews. The interview sample included twenty-
two respondents representing different institutional shareholders. Interview respondents 
included mainly high profile/senior managers of large asset management companies, pension 
funds, and securities houses in Nigeria. Although a large part of the respondents were from 
private pension funds. The first sets of interviews were conducted in the last quarter of 2008 
at Lagos and Port Harcourt, both of which are major financial cities in Nigeria. The second 
stage of interviews was conducted in the second and last quarter of 2012. This involved a mix 
of both telephone and face to face interviews. We did not find any substantial change in the 
interviewees’ views between these two periods. Thus, the different sets of interviews helped 
us to validate claims and gather further evidence on the themes that had emerged from the 
first interviews. For both stages, the face-to-face interviews were conducted at the corporate 
offices of the interviewees. The interviewees were given a form to complete to capture their 
demographic details and relevant information about their institutions. The interviewees were 
promised anonymity. Therefore, numerical codes have been used to conceal the institutional 
shareholders’ identity (B1 – B23). The interviews lasted from between 30mins and an hour.  
 
The interviewees were asked to comment on different aspects relating to institutional 
shareholder activism, including the concept, its existence in Nigeria, their engagement in 
shareholder activism and the impediments/challenges faced. The respondents were asked 
whether their financial institution adopted a passive or an active approach toward institutional 
shareholder activism (See Table 3). The interviewees were encouraged to speak freely. They 
were also promised anonymity. For institutional shareholders, a formal set of questions was 
followed during the course of the interviews. Questions also evolved during the interview 
process Interviewees were encouraged to speak exhaustively on the topics. Interviews were 
tape recorded and the data was later transcribed. Hand-written notes were used to support the 
data gathering process. Certain themes emerged around the nature of institutional shareholder 
activism from the interview questions and the transcribed text. A coding scheme was 
thereafter developed around these themes. This is highlighted in the empirical section. 
Interviews proved appropriate in investigating how institutional shareholders perform their 
functions and the impediments they face as activists.  
 
This paper recognises that while the interviews were insightful, they are prone to subjectivity 
and bias (Shotter and Gergen, 1994). Also, to add further validity to the research, findings in 
this research were corroborated after the interview. Checks were made using documentary 
evidence from the public domain in the form of prospectuses and newspaper reports. The 
empirical results suggest that the financial institutions that were identified by their 
representatives during the interviews as active institutional shareholders included a mix of 
private closed and open pension funds and asset management companies. Their participation 
was confirmed by other interviewees when respondents were asked to list active institutional 
shareholders. Altogether, the key players included ARM Pension Company (including their 
asset company), AIICO (pension), and StanbicIBTC
2
. The active institutional shareholders 
mentioned, but not interviewed due to access problems, included Actis and Shell Pension and 
Asset Company (SAMCo). The interviewees that explicitly stated that their institution 
actively participated in shareholder activism were three out of the top five public pension 
funds in Table 1
3
.  
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5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The empirical section examines the state of shareholder activism in Nigeria. It reviews the 
institutional shareholder approach towards activism. Evidence suggested that institutional 
shareholders either adopted an active or passive approach to shareholder activism.  
 
5.1 Institutional shareholder activism: Active approach  
The findings suggest that some private pension funds were part of the institutional 
shareholders in Nigeria that took an active role in shareholder activism. However, there was 
no evidence to suggest that the public pension funds engaged in shareholder activism. 
Overall, this result shows that private pension funds in a developing country like Nigeria 
participate in shareholder activism. This contrasts with the findings from prior studies on 
developed countries which show that public pensions are key players in shareholder activism 
(Gillan and Stark, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2002).  
 
Improving business productivity: We find that the respondents considered the use of their 
influence over management through dialogue and resources as an important means of 
strategically improving business productivity as reflected in these statements. “Most times 
they will go into discussions with some members of the board...try to sell the idea to some 
members of the board to see reasons” [B11].  Another respondent stated, “…we might want 
to influence management, we might want to influence the decision of the company, we might 
want to be influential in bringing top executives that will enhance productivity” [B6]. The 
interviewees suggested that the build-up of large controlling shares in the companies 
provided an incentive for institutional shareholders for example, in the case of Actis and 
SAMCo. A respondent stated, “[Shell], their pension arms… because of their stake in such 
organisations, they try to influence some of the decisions taken by these companies” [B11]. 
The findings indicate that the active institutional shareholders were willing to contribute 
resources to turn around underperforming companies. Respondent B7 noted that his 
institution contributed financial resources. 
 
 “There are companies that are underperforming with abundant 
opportunities…when we target them we put in some investment there and 
restructure and later sell”[B7]. 
 
Meanwhile, B3 pointed out that his institution contributed knowledge expertise as seen 
in the quote below. 
 
We basically work with the company and its management; we try and bring in 
technical expertise or whatever it is to assist them to turn around [the company]. 
We are very proud to have done this successfully in a number of cases including 
companies such as RT Brisco. Before ARM invested in R.T Brisco about six or 
so years ago, it was definitely nowhere, but now it is the darling of the stock 
exchange. We did this similarly with UTC [B3]  
 
In the last excerpt, a respondent explains the strategy of his institution which includes 
providing technical skill, financial advice and other relevant resources. The responses 
suggested that institutional shareholders appeared interested in long-term business growth. 
B18 summarises this claim, “we are interested in growth”. It was pointed out that institutional 
shareholder activism was seen as a way of “protecting their investment” [B11]. Yakasai 
(2001, p.241) asserted that institutional investors in Nigeria are able to influence the board “if 
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several of them collude or act in congruence”. We provide empirical support for this 
argument. We find that the process of shareholder activism involved solo efforts as well as 
collaboration with other institutional shareholders. For [B23], “it is largely more of a solo 
effort rather than collaboration with other institutional shareholders.” [B21] stated “If it is an 
issue we feel strongly about, we come together….we do not have many instance where we 
come together”. Another respondent commented, “When there is a move and the company 
writes, we then talk to each other and probably discuss it further; … Even beyond the AGM 
and EGM we still meet and talk” [B18]. Another respondent noted, “My tactic will be to 
identify similar affected shareholders and try to create a group” [B3]. He also stated, 
 
“The way we work is essentially to use activism in the context of going in there 
singularly or together with selective investors to form a sizeable stake in order to 
influence and work with management to improve things” [B3]  
 
In sum, the interviews showed that there was strategic collaboration between institutional 
shareholders as well as other major shareholders.  
 
Demand for accountability as a result of inadequate information: The interviews revealed 
that inadequate information in the market was a challenge to institutional investors. For 
example, B9 notes, “a major challenge that we have is lack of information”. This information 
gap had driven institutional shareholders to demand greater transparency and accountability 
from management in order to ensure better decision-making and improved financial 
performance. 
 
“For issues we feel strongly about, we attend [the AGM]… It is usually business 
related... Company A recently went into this transaction with Company B which 
is South African. They were going to sell the food component of their 
business...They wanted shareholders to approve it...We said we needed to know 
the details of the transactions for us to tell the company to go ahead. We felt that 
information was required. We voted against that resolution. We voiced our 
displeasure....Coincidentally, two of us were big institutional shareholders, the 
other was institution B [Name removed]...So what they said that we should put 
down our names and they would get back to us.... We had a right to demand for 
information we consider necessary... [B21] 
 
This quote is about an incident involving a representative of an active institutional 
shareholders that felt inadequately informed about the company’s strategic decision. Two top 
active institutional shareholders were reported as expressing their displeasure about the 
adequacy of the information provided by voting against the company’s resolutions. The 
interviews showed that active institutional shareholders expected management to be 
accountable. 
 
[Today], management are made to realise that it is not business as usual. They 
need to increase their level of accountability. It is more of a situation where 
investors are pushing for more information in the company. …we are able to get 
information from the companies because we have a substantial stake. Small 
shareholders cannot get it….” [B23] 
 
Despite these reports, the interviewees indicated that few institutional shareholders 
participated in shareholder activism in Nigeria. The level of engagement in institutional 
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shareholder activism was considered low. “Institutional investor activism in Nigeria is still 
not very pronounced” (B12). “If you look across the industry and the potential for 
institutional shareholder activism...there is very little activism going on” (B1).  
 
5.2 Institutional shareholder activism: Passive approach  
Most of the respondents that represented mainly small institutional shareholders indicated 
that their institution adopted a passive approach to shareholder activism. The rationale 
provided is grouped under two themes: profit maximization, threat of business relationship as 
well as the regulation and structure of the pension funds. 
 
Profit Maximisation: Some of the interviewees commented on the eagerness of institutional 
shareholders to dispose of their stock when companies were found to be under performing. 
They pointed out that the passive institutional shareholders preference for liquidating their 
investment rather than investing resources to help improve the company was motivated by 
their self-interest. The passive institutional shareholders’ main focus was on prioritising the 
protection of their business interests over the interest of the company within their portfolio. A 
respondent describes this observed behaviour, 
 
 “They watch their investment very closely, instead of them putting in corrective 
measures, when they sense something [is wrong], their own proactive approach is 
to divest” [B4].  
 
Responses showed that this was quite a prevalent practice.  
 
“Once we detect the company is not doing well, we merely liquidate….. if we 
find out that a company is not doing well we start reducing our position in that 
company if it involves us liquidating 100% we move out of the company” [B10]. 
 
“The position usual is to liquidate our investment....I will say, we are more 
passive than active” [B21].  
 
The aim of this strategy was to protect the profit and cash flow of the financial institution. 
Another respondent stated that the ‘year-end’ of an institution influences its drive for 
profitability. He noted that liquidating their investment in poorly performing firms meant 
that, “(1) it will be recorded that you made significant profit from your investment, and (2) 
you will have less cash flow that is tied down in stock in your investment portfolio” (B12). 
This situation reflects the dominance of short-termism. Institutional shareholders are more 
interested in profit maximization and are less concerned about the long-term prospects of the 
target company. Hansen and Hill (1991) argue that this condition is reflected in the 
performance measures applied by institutional shareholders which are usually short-sighted, 
emphasising mainly profitability. Incurring large cost through shareholder activism was 
viewed as reducing the prospective profit of the financial institution. The discussion 
highlighted that governance cost was considered a barrier to engagement in activism. This 
was mentioned by one respondent: “Why we do not have pronounced institutional 
shareholder activism is because of the huge capital involvement” (B12). This is consistent 
with previous studies (Pozen, 1994; Romano, 2001).  In the case of a poorly performing 
company, the exit option (selling their stakes) was used to avoid incurring governance cost.  
 
Threat to Business relationship: The interviews revealed that the relationship between 
financial institutions and their clients in Nigeria had implication for shareholder activism. 
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This was because some clients had business relationship with related divisions of banks. 
These banks held ownership interest in asset management companies and pension fund which 
served the same client. The potential for conflicting interest arises when clients have business 
relationship with banks and their subsidiaries, for example private pension funds. These same 
clients also have significant shares in the banks.   
 
“Some clients participate in all parts of the business in the banks. Some have 
banking relationship, they invested in them though the pension arm, then they 
have asset management facilities through the asset management arm of this 
group, therefore we have to keep it separate, it is a requirement for this group” 
[B1].  
 
The small pension and mutual funds that were in a dependent relationship faced a conflict of 
interest in their business relationship. Cremers and Nair (2005) explains that the commercial 
network of firms place private pensions and banks under pressure to support management. 
They cite an example of proxy voting. We find that the conflict of interests extends to 
pension reports on target investment as shown in the excerpt below.   
 
“We face conflict of interest, most of the fund management companies are 
actually owned by banks, and so what you find is that I cannot report badly about 
a company that my parent company is managing. In our case, we are a subsidiary 
of a bank...some specific companies which they manage instead of giving an 
opinion, we rather not give an opinion....In 2008, somebody wrote about another 
company, he was fired…” [B21] 
 
The interviews revealed that actions that portrayed institutional shareholders in a negative 
light before management were considered a threat to their business interest. Thus, shareholder 
activism was seen as damaging to their brand, reputation and customer base, which can have 
eventual consequences on their financial returns. “We look at it [shareholder activism] as an 
act of indiscipline to engage in such activities” [B19]. 
 
“..You look at the brand [referring to the impact]. Activism connotes more of a 
gladiatorship. You see, you want to protect you name. There is a network. No 
organisation operates within a vacuum. There is interdependency. If you push 
yourself to the forefront and you try to fight a cause without looking at the 
consequences, other companies may be watching and it may be reported in the 
paper that you pioneered such a fight, and it may make you lose your brand 
reputation or patronage…” [B12] 
 
Some of the representatives of the institutional shareholders in our sample regarded 
shareholder activism as a hostile activity. They were of the view that direct 
confrontation with management was detrimental to their negative public image. 
  
Institutional shareholder activism is not very attractive, it is seen as hostile. 
People resist it. We do not think it is worthwhile with our little shareholding to go 
and start prompting these managerial changes, and even if we do, remember the 
first reason why we were able to make the investment is because we believe in 
the management and what is going on in that place…”[B4] 
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In our interviews, more evidence of institutional shareholders paying particular attention to 
their business interests and relationships is highlighted in these two quotes: “Our positions 
are purely investment. We are not cut out for remaining in a company for such activities as 
shareholder activism” [B11]. In this excerpt, the respondent notes that shareholder activism 
was distractive. This activity was not considered part of the normal business activities. This 
same sentiment is expressed in the next quote. “Except you do not have any other business 
and you are just intent on taking over companies…we have our business to do, we have 
returns to give, we have a business, we have to pay pensions” [B4]. The interviewees 
expressed an inclination to remain profitable as a business by maintaining sustainable 
business networks and relationships, and for a lot of these investors, shareholder activism was 
perceived as conflicting with this objective.  
 
The regulation and structure of the pension funds: According to Johnson et al (2010, p.1593), 
“Institutional owners face different forms of regulatory and normative pressures depending 
on their legal classiﬁcation”. In Nigeria, evidence from this research suggests that the pension 
sector faced its own unique set of regulatory constraints. The restrictions on investments did 
not incentivise pension funds to hold large proportion of shares in companies. Such holdings 
were considered by respondents as crucial to effective shareholder activism. The interviewees 
disclosed that the pension regulation restricted the size of shareholdings in companies. 
Furthermore, pension funds were required to invest in equities companies that had achieved 
specific credit ratings.  
 
Pension funds managers are not allowed to invest in all stocks...they have 
selected stocks that they can invest in [B12] 
 
“…the investment guideline allows up to 25%. This relatively low exposure to 
the stock market, in my view, is therefore one of the reasons that there has been a 
delay in the take-off of significant level of shareholder activism [B21] 
 
The maximum you can hold is 25% in equities and this is in itself quite negligible 
….in the sense that you could not actually influence nor effectively monitor 
things [B1]. 
 
The excerpts show that the pension funds faced legal restrictions on the proportion of 
investment that could be made in equities of companies. The PFAs were faced with an 
investment opportunity of only 25% in the capital market out of the total pension funds under 
their management. This restriction meant that the PFAs faced a significant reduction in the 
volume of equities that were potentially available for purchase in companies. Hence, a 
recurring issue in the interviews was that regulation limited the ability of private pension 
funds to increase their portfolio holdings beyond the legal limit of 25% in equities. This was 
compounded by the small quantity of pension fund assets at the disposal of most pension 
funds except for the top three.  
 
Respondents further indicated that the structure of the pension fund did not help the 
development of institutional shareholder activism. Specific reference was made to the 
separation of PFC and PFAs functions. Whilst PFAs warehouse their clients’ funds with 
PFCs and advise on investment patterns (Pension, 2008), PFCs viewed their role as primarily 
providing investment services for PFAs as shown in this quote, “we are [Pension] custodians. 
We are not directly involved in investment portfolio, what we do are investment services” 
[B4]. Interviews revealed that the PFCs were expected to receive the proxy voting right on 
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behalf of the PFA and vote at AGMs. Attendance at AGMs is viewed as driven by the desire 
to comply with regulations rather than to be involved in governance activities. A PFA 
representative commented, 
 
For AGMs and other meetings called by Companies, PFAs are mostly represented 
by PFCs (Pension Fund Custodians – subsidiaries of banks that have the 
responsibility of holding all Pension assets in Custody) as proxies. This also 
reduces the level of shareholder activism that is expected as they only attend for 
administrative and regulatory purposes only...One of their responsibilities is to 
attend the AGM as proxies on behalf of the PFA.... [B21] 
 
The respondent continues, 
 
We have PFAs with insignificantly levels of equities, they are not giving it as 
much commitment as an institution that has a lot more at stake..... there is a major 
skew in the market...my company is one of them creating the skew...we and 
another PFAs have the highest allocation of equity.... [B21] 
 
The skewed nature of the market where most PFAs had small shareholdings did not 
encourage shareholder activism. Most of the PFCs represented small PFAs. In Table 2, we 
identified Zenith PFC as having the biggest pension funds in the Nigerian market. Zenith 
PFC had all three active institutional shareholders as PFAs. The general opinion was that 
PFAs with small investments were not in a favourable position in terms of voting. This may 
explain why most PFCs that serve small PFAs exhibit a lacklustre attitude towards activism. 
 
Our business is peculiar in the sense that while we are the fund managers, there is 
a custodian, Zenith Pension Custodian or First Pension Custodian. They are the 
ones that actually deal with the investment we make to that extent. We ought to 
advise them and indicate how we wish to vote in term of management decision.  
We have not been very active. Passive approach! Basically, because we really do 
not have sufficient stake in the company because of our regulation [B1] 
 
Pension fund companies that are supposed to be very vocal in the affairs of the 
company do not seem to take interest in affairs of the company since they can’t 
be influential as [they would have] desired [B4]. 
 
Overall, the interviews revealed that there was a passive attitude on the part of most PFAs in 
advising PFC on the voting pattern on management agenda at AGM meetings.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Our research investigated the existence of institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. The 
study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to prior literature by providing new 
empirical evidence on institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. This has been overlooked 
in prior research literature which has largely concentrated on activist work by shareholders’ 
associations (Adegbite et al., 2012; Amao and Amaeshi 2008; Uche and Atkins, 2015). The 
study provided evidence of low-levels of institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. The 
findings suggest that the few active institutional shareholders used shareholder activism to 
openly express concern for improved business productivity and demand better transparency 
and accountability. They were willing to use their holdings as a way of influencing 
corporations. However, the findings revealed that most institutional shareholders in Nigeria 
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adopt a passive approach to shareholder activism. The study shows that institutional 
shareholders representing small private pension, securities and mutual funds avoid 
shareholder activism in order to protect their business relationships, to maximize profit and 
avoid governance cost. They are also constrained by their small shareholdings. These 
rationales are consistent with prior literature (David and Kochhar, 1996; Roman, 2001). 
However, there were some findings that are considered unique to the Nigerian setting. We 
found that regulation was a key driver in impeding institutional shareholder participation in 
shareholder activism. Regulation requires pension funds to limit the size of investment to 
25% in highly rated equities. This means that institutional shareholders faced restrictions in 
investment opportunities and as a consequence, their controlling influence is limited. 
 
Second, the study contributes to prior literature which addresses pension fund participation in 
institutional shareholder activism. The existing literature addresses public pension funds 
managed by a single type of financial institution (Bainbridge, 2008; Carleton et al, 1998; 
Cremers and Nair, 2005). By contrast, this study provides new insights into the complexities 
associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are 
expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country. Thus, our findings 
have important implications for the pension fund industry. Our findings suggest that the 
current separation between PFCs and PFAs functions appeared to discourage direct 
engagement with corporate managers. We note that the PFAs interviewed acknowledged that 
they were responsible for communicating institutional shareholder displeasure by advising 
the PFCs on how to vote at meetings. However, only two pension funds belonging to the top 
five stated that they had gone as far as collecting their proxies and voting. They noted that 
this was not a regular practice. David et al (2001, p.146) documented that proxy based 
institutional shareholders are more effective in “extracting the appropriate response from 
managers”. However, our findings suggest that proxies are only effective under two 
conditions. First, institutional shareholders need to have easier access to proxies to enable 
them vote. Second, where a secondary institution legally receives the proxies on behalf of 
another institution, both parties needs to show a level of interest in shareholder activism to 
increase coordination between both institutions. 
 
Third, the study makes a methodological contribution by using an interpretive approach in 
exploring the view of institutional shareholders on shareholder activism. This differs from 
prior literature which is dominated by positivist or normative approaches (Brav et al, 2008; 
Goranova and Ryan, 2014; Ryan and Schneider, 2002). The paper makes a practical 
contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider the trade-off associated with a 
skewed market of small institutional shareholders and the conditions that promote better 
governance practices and performance. This paper identifies some limitations and directions 
for future research. For example, the findings, while insightful, are based on qualitative data 
in one country. Caution needs to be exercised in understanding the implications in other 
country settings. Also, stakeholder accountability theory can be used to explore how 
stakeholder engage with management, in future research. Overall, this paper advances an 
important new discourse, documenting new evidence of levels of shareholder activism in a 
country within the sub-Saharan African region. Some of the insights provided in this paper 
may explain the minimal impact of institutional shareholder activism in the corporate 
environment of developing market economies. 
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Notes 
1. As of the 15th June 2015, 1.00 US dollar = 198.85 Nigerian naira 
2. The National Pension commission officially published its annual reports only up to 2011 
on its website. 
3. One asset company requested anonymity. 
 
 
 Table 1 Rank of PFA by Asset Size 
   
PFA rank Q3: 2010 Q4: 2010 Q1: 2011 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of 
Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of 
Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Amount 
(N’Million) 
% of Total  
Pension  
Assets 
Top 3 399.42 55.63 448.10 54.85 483.64 55.35 
Top 5 504.42 70.26 563.19 68.93 601.92 68.88 
Top 10 664.25 92.52 744.86 91.17 797.02 91.21 
Bottom 3 0.83 0.11 0.91 0.11 0.96 0.11 
Bottom 5 2.00 0.28 2.38 0.29 2.50 0.29 
Bottom 10 14.08 1.96 16.95 2.08 18.70 2.14 
Source: Pencom Annual report, 2011 
 
 
Table 2 PFCs Appointed for Management of RSA Funds 
(S/n)/PFC First Custodian UBA Custodian Diamond 
Custodian 
Zenith Custodian 
1 Premium Pensure Royal Trust IBTC 
2 First Guarantee Sigma  ARM 
3 NLPC Pensions Alliance  Trustfund 
4 Crusade Legacy   
5 AIICO PENMAN   
6 Oak Anchor   
7 Amana Evergreen   
8 FUG    
9 APT Pension    
10 Fidelity Pension    
11 CRIB Pension    
12 Standard Alliance    
13 IGI    
     
Source: Pencom Annual report, 2011 
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Table 3. Local Institutional investors’ profiles 
CODES Position Type Status as a financial 
institution 
Approach to shareholder 
activism  
B1 Head of Investment-
Executive Director 
Pensions Bank subsidiary Passive 
B2 Assistant banking Officer Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B3 Managing Director 
Investment banking 
Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B4 Area Business Manager Pensions 
Custodians 
Independent Passive 
B5 Assistant Vice President Pension 
Custodians 
Bank subsidiary Active 
B6 Vice President Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B7 Research Associate Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B8 Investment Analyst Investment 
company 
Independent Active 
B9 Head of Operations Investment 
company 
Independent Passive 
B10 Head of Investment Pensions Bank subsidiary Passive 
B11 Fund Manager Pensions Independent Passive 
B12 Chief Operating Officer Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B13 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B14 Group Head Investment Pension Bank subsidiary Passive 
B15 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B16 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B17 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Passive 
B18 Head Investment  Pension Independent Active 
B19 Fund Manager Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Passive 
B20 Research Analyst Securities Bank subsidiary Active 
B21 Fund Manager Pensions Bank subsidiary  
B23 Head of Investment Investment 
company 
Bank subsidiary Active 
 
*Coding for B22 was not used for institutional shareholders 
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